A Refutation of David Bentley Hart’s That All Shall Be Saved

Nov 2, 7528 O.S
N.S.
Book Review Orthodoxy Philosophy Theology
Last modified: Nov 22, 2019

Introduction

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This document serves as a collection of arguments refuting various points of David Bentley Hart’s book That All Shall Be Saved. It is very much a work in progress and is not guaranteed to be entirely systematic nor complete. It serves more as a working set of notes for me to collect my thoughts on the book and to facilitate discussion.

Starting Points

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Hart makes many fallacious claims throughout the book, without relevant citation nor discussion. Here are a few main ones:

Several of these assertions are found on page 6 of the work, where Hart adopts a pseudo-woe-is-me form of argumentation, saying that anyone who disagrees with him (the majority) will fall back on one of these old, tired forms of argumentation. Hart adopts this stance as an emotional appeal to the reader and to infer that these forms of argumentation are outdated and have been refuted, yet despite this Hart offers no substantial argument against any of these positions.

As a general trend Hart does not offer any citations, or much in the way of strict argumentation throughout the work. This, he would likely defend on the grounds that it is a popular work aimed at a general audience and not a scholarly work. This is true, however, I will argue that this does not excuse his work in this instance. This is for several reasons.

First, Hart is making quite extraordinary claims that fly in the face of orthodox christian tradition and thought. Such claims should require some form of argumentation in their favor, even if not largely footnoted. If it is not possible to present such arguments in a popular way, then perhaps the work should not have been aimed at a popular audience at all. As it stands, the work only serves to sow seeds of doubt and unrest in faithful who do not know better to see through Hart’s lack of rigor. This may be more excusable if Hart’s claims were better worked out elsewhere, even if not in the present work, but this brings us to the second point.

Second, Hart has not seemingly given a more thorough treatment of his claims in this book anywhere. As documented by others, such as here, Hart has repeatedly refused to provide direct evidence for his claims in other, more appropriate (i.e. not in an informal popular work) mediums. While perhaps his writing of a popular work without citation or rigorous argumentation could be excused were this provided elsewhere, given its lack and his push-back when questioned, it is difficult to view the present work as much more than smoke and mirrors. That is to say, Hart has presented a popular, perhaps psychologically persuasive, account, which he claims to be capital T True. Yet, in the work he offers no citation and no real argumentation (by real argumentation here I mean a philosophical justification and not circumstantial and psychological ’evidence’), but only asserts that it is the case. Thus, at the end of the day, all Hart has for his ‘argument’ is an assertion. This is not merely because it is a popular work, but that it is a popular work serves to screen the fact that there is no substance or true argumentation behind it to be found at all.

Hart’s Claims Examined

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Now we can examine each of Hart’s claims mentioned previously to see how they are both unsubstantiated and false.

Universalism and the Fifth Oecumenical Council

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On page 6 Hart claims that the 5th Oecumenical council has not anathematized the universalist views he is espousing, contrary to other opinion. He offers no grounds here as to why his claim is true. Let’s examine the available evidence.

The first place to look is at the ten anathemas of 543 available here. These were written by Emperor Justinian to Mennas, Patriarch of Constantinople, advising him to convene a synod to condemn Origen. This letter was seen by all the patriarchs of the church and was given assent by all. Most interesting is the 9th anathema.

  1. If anyone says or thinks that the punishment of demons and of impious men is only temporary, and will one day have an end, and that a restoration (apokatastasis) will take place, let him be anathema.

The added italicized emphasis above makes clear the relevant part for Hart’s view. Hart clearly states in his work that his view may include a temporary punishment, but on no uncertain terms does he deny an eternal punishment. This position clearly falls under the 9th anathema stated above. This importantly does not anathematize all forms of apokatastasis, such as that of Saint John Damascene, but crucially does anathematize those views which include only temporary punishment.

“But,” Hart may say, “this is not an Oecumenical council.”

It is true that in some sense these anathemas were not the product of an Oecumenical council, yet they were accepted by all the patriarchs of the church. Furthermore, ten years later in 553 Emperor Justinian would convene the Fifth Oecumenical council. This council was received by several of the very same patriarchs who had accepted the anathemas ten years prior, most notably Pope Vigilius of Rome.

Furthermore, in the eleventh anathema of the council, Origen’s name is found among “heretics who have already been condemned.” The topic of Origenism itself may not have been discussed during the sessions of the Fifth council proper, as it was convened rather against the “Three Chapters.” This was not due to a major shift in the acceptance of Origenism, but rather that it had already been dealt with and was not the main issue at hand. Thus, while it is perhaps technically true in some sense that the council itself does not condemn Origenism, specifically this version of universalism, it is only true in the narrowest of technical terms. This is shown by the reception by the council of the condemnation of Origin, by many of the same people ten years prior, seen explicitly in his mention as already having been condemned. A further explicit condemnation of these views would have been superfluous, as they had already been condemned at the synod ten years prior, and the Oecumenical council receives this condemnation.

Fr. John Whiteford makes an interesting contribution in understanding of the Fifth Oecumenical council when he quotes Hart as saying:

That very imperial “ecumenical ” council is an embarrassment in Christian history, and I sometimes think it a mercy that such a hash was made of its promulgation that we literally do not know what was truly determined there. For my money, if Origen was not a saint and church father, then no one has any claim to those titles. And the contrary claims made by a brutish imbecile Emperor are of no consequence

This is certainly quite an interesting perspective to take on an Oecumenical council. Seemingly, Hart would perhaps argue that these sources on the council have been corrupted or something of the sort. Even accepting this on its face, there are numerous other sources corroborating the condemnation of Origen, such as the Quintisext council, unless it too is corrupted, in its statement that Origen was indeed condemned at the previous councils.

We take the pious utterances of the one hundred and sixty-five God-bearing Fathers who assembled upon the ground of this Imperial City in the reign of Justinian, who became our Emperor and who passed away at the termination of his pious career, and, recognizing them to have been inspired and uttered by the (Holy) Spirit, we teach them outright to our posterity; which Fathers indeed as a Council anathematized and consigned to abomination Theodore of Mopsuestia, the teacher of Nestorius, and in addition Origen …

Aside from the councils themselves, there are other sources of corroboration, such as the Liturgy. Take for example this section of the Synodikon of Orthodoxy.

To them who accept and transmit the vain Greek teachings that there is a pre-existence of souls and teach that all things were not produced and did not come into existence out of non-being, that there is an end to the torment or a restoration again of creation and of human affairs, meaning by such teachings that the Kingdom of Heaven is entirely perishable and fleeting, whereas the Kingdom of Heaven is eternal and indissoluble as Christ our God Himself taught and delivered to us, and as we have ascertained from the entire Old and New Testaments, that the torment is unending and the Kingdom everlasting, to them who by such teachings both destroy themselves and become agents of eternal condemnation to others, Anathema! Anathema! Anathema!

Most importantly this quotation by Hart on the Fifth Oecumenical council gives an insight into how Hart is approaching the question. This viewpoint will become more important later, but for now we can move on to examining another of Hart’s assertions.

The Supposed Logical Contradiction Between God’s Justice and Goodness

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One of Hart’s major ideological opponents throughout the work is that of Thomism. While I am not here to defend Thomism, having several issues with the system myself, Hart’s treatment of it is haphazard and unsatisfying.

Hart begins his critique of the Thomist position by analyzing the Thomist view on being, as the first good. Thus in the Thomistic scheme existence, even one of everlasting torment, is definitionally better than non-existence. Hart asserts on page 18 that “only well-being is being-as-gift in a true and meaningful sense; mere bare existence is nothing but a brute fact.” This is an assertion by Hart and, at the very least in the Thomistic schema, is false.

Hart will later go on to admit that this is open to debate (it is not clear however if he is referring to bare existence as brute fact, or to his jab at Thomism’s view of being as idolatry). Yet, despite this he will say that the “Thomist position here is not … “wrong”–it does not rise to the level of the correct or incorrect–but … it is utterly devoid of so much as a trace of compelling logical content.” This is a very bold, and dare I say arrogant, assertion. Hart is trying to import his presupposed notion of being as brute fact into the Thomistic schema where it contradicts the Thomistic view of being and then argue that the position thus is not right or wrong but devoid of logical content. Surely, if you import your presupposed view of being into the system a contradiction will result, but this neither shows his view of being to be correct, nor does it render the Thomistic schema itself void of logical content in this respect.

It is unclear here whether Hart merely is unable to perform a presuppositional analysis of his views, particularly on being, and thus he takes his presupposed view on being as the only logical possibility, or he is arguing in bad faith. His view on being, rather, is not the view of the Thomistic system, nor would I argue that of any orthodox christian metaphysic, but rather that of the rationalistic enlightenment. There is thus no contradiction in the Thomistic scheme (here at least) except for the one he has imported himself.

The contradiction Hart is trying to set up between God’s Goodness and His Justice is not so much a logical contradiction, but a terminological one. Hart is asserting, knowingly or not, a different definition of being than that held in the Thomist view. There is no strictly speaking logical contradiction within the Thomist view itself here, rather the contradiction is between Hart’s definition of being and the rest of the Thomist view.

On page 26 Hart will later admit he thinks that there is less of a logical disagreement than with the “dogmatic imperatives to which certain of the disputants feel bound.” In a certain sense, I agree with him, although not in the sense he intends. There is not so much a logical inconsistency in the Thomist system, but rather Hart’s inability to examine the Thomist system in itself outside of his own presuppositions on being, which being seemingly unexamined are likely equally unjustified epistemically (they certainly aren’t remotely shown to be so in this work).

Hart then continues to offer an emotional argument on the psychological state of a generic Thomist man, starting on page 36. He argues on this basis that his opponents couldn’t possibly actually believe what they claim to deep down, because they don’t act in accord with this belief. Hart argues that if the Thomist philosopher truly believed as he claims, he would never dare to bring a child into the world, nor would he ever rest for a moment from a frenzy of evangelism.

This argument, while being quite frankly extremely condescending, is ridiculous. If the Thomist believes as he professes, one such proposition being that being is the first good, as stated by Hart earlier, of course he would have children. It is entirely consistent with the Thomistic view that it is better to bring a child to existence and have it unfortunately end up in eternal torment than for the child never to exist at all. This foundational to the Thomistic system. This behavior would only be inconsistent if the Thomist held the same views on being that Hart presupposes and also held to the existence of an eternal hell. This argument then only demonstrates, not that the Thomist doesn’t believe in an eternal hell, but that the Thomist does hold to the Thomistic view on being, rather than Hart’s.

Regarding evangelism, surely Hart could see that devoting his life to philosophical works could be precisely how he is best able to evangelize. Hart, as one who has devoted himself to authorship, should be among the first to see the value in books and writing in spreading one’s idea. Hart who is presumably intending that the reader of his book come to adopt the same universalism he shares, decided to write a book about it rather than taking his views door to door. Certainly, in Hart’s view the stakes aren’t the same, but Hart does view the opposing position as something that would be better if people didn’t hold to it, or he would never have written his book (well, perhaps for money, but I digress).

It is quite interesting how Hart, on page 26, mentions that “the whole question … is one whose answer should be immediately obvious to a properly functioning moral intelligence.” Yet, is a ‘properly functioning moral intelligence’ here just one that holds the same presuppositions as Hart? Hart’s presuppositions will be a key factor in examining his claim that he is not judging God by an external standard, which we will now turn to.

Hart’s Standard for Judging God

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Around page 52 Hart begins to defend himself against the foreseen argument that he is merely judging God on an external standard, and God as such cannot be judged so. I will put aside the argument he offers against the Thomist philosopher Davies, although I do find it to be flawed, to engage once again in a presuppositional critique of Hart’s position.

The main trust of Hart’s defense is that he is merely looking to see whether a particular view of God, His goodness, and His justice, has coherence. This is all well and good in a sense, but as we examined earlier, this is not quite what he is in fact doing. Hart has been importing his own presupposed view of being into the Thomistic system which he is attempting to critique. Thus, he is not looking at the coherence of the Thomistic system in se, but rather a union of the Thomistic system with certain of his presuppositions. Given the nature of his presupposition on being, namely that it directly contradicts the Thomistic view on being, any system including both Hart’s view and the Thomistic view will be necessarily incoherent.

Interestingly enough, Hart does seem to share some other presuppositions with the Thomist, from the logic of so-called “classical theism,” as he discusses on pages 50-1. What is most peculiar is that Hart shares the view that God’s goodness and His justice are both strictly speaking convertible with God’s essence, and thus also with each other. This is a view which is in contrast with the essence-energies distinction so famously defended by Saint Gregory of Palamas. While I am not intending to get into a discussion on this debate here, it is interesting how Hart, a supposed Orthodox Christian, would have more in common with the Thomistic position here. At least in terms of theology, it appears as though Hart takes the conclusions of “classical theism” as a presuppositional starting point (that is not to say that he would claim its conclusions as presuppositional rather than rationally demonstrated, but that they are taken as presuppositions from the perspective of theology). This again is an approach with much in common with the Thomist.

Perhaps these presuppositional similarities come from Hart’s time as a High Church Anglican prior to his conversion to Orthodoxy. In fact, many of Hart’s presuppositions, even unacknowledged, can be accounted for by his background. “Classical theism” from his background as an Anglican, and his rationalistic-enlightenment presuppositions on being from his training in the field of comparative religion. This is not to say that Hart necessarily has no epistemic justification for these presuppositions (although ultimately I would argue that to be the case, as I would argue these presuppositions to be false), although it does offer some evidence that he may not, especially given his employment of them against his opponents in a silent, unacknowledged way, as this indicates that he has not examined them qua presuppositions and has taken them without epistemic justification.

The rationalistic presuppositions that Hart has, likely from his studies in comparative religion, where this enlightenment neutrality is a necessary presupposition, shape his views both of the condemnation of universalism, as examined somewhat previously, and his rejection of scripture as contradicting universalism, as we will examine next in brief.

The Contradiction Between Scripture and Universalism

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Hart claims that despite the claims of many that scripture itself contradicts universalism, this is not the case. To refute Hart’s claim, we will examine his motivations for claiming this, which while not clearly expressed in the present work, are ascertained from his previous statements, such as those collected by Fr. John here, and the previous presuppositional analysis.

Hart will likely take the position that passages such as Mark 9:43-48

And if thy hand offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter into life maimed, than having two hands to go into hell [gehenna], into the fire that never shall be quenched: where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. And if thy foot offend thee, cut it off: it is better for thee to enter halt into life, than having two feet to be cast into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched: Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched. And if thine eye offend thee, pluck it out: it is better for thee to enter into the kingdom of God with one eye, than having two eyes to be cast into hell fire: where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched

and others where a seeming eternity of suffering awaits, are, if we read the original Greek text, rather referring to the ages of ages, or aeons, which, Hart would argue, do not refer to an unending temporal period. This is on the basis of the secular study of the meaning of the Greek term aion. This is fine, but what this argument fails to grasp is twofold. First, many of the Greek terms used by the early Christian writers, whilst sharing form with that of their pagan counterparts, were with a very different meaning. Take for example the term hypostasis, among many others. Thus, in examining the Christian interpretation of the aion, we must not rely merely on secular studies (of course this is not to say they are necessarily flawed or cannot have true claims, they can of course be taken into account, but cannot be the sole basis of argumentation).

This approach follows in line with Hart’s rationalistic-enlightenment presuppositions of neutrality. How then should we approach the passage then? We must come to an understanding of scripture through the mind of the fathers and of the tradition of the church. We ourselves cannot come to the truth of scripture as an atomistic individual, like many protestants would hold knowingly or not. How much more then can we not rely purely on secular examination of terms alone to come to its truth. If we are to look at the history of interpretations of these various passages of scripture we find that they are interpreted to mean precisely what Hart does not want them to mean.

Take for example Saint John Chrysostom’s Homily 3 on second Thessalonians.

There are many men, who form good hopes not by abstaining from their sins, but by thinking that hell is not so terrible as it is said to be, but milder than what is threatened, and temporary, not eternal; and about this they philosophize much. But I could show from many reasons, and conclude from the very expressions concerning hell, that it is not only not milder, but much more terrible than is threatened. But I do not now intend to discourse concerning these things. For the fear even from bare words is sufficient, though we do not fully unfold their meaning. But that it is not temporary, hear Paul now saying, concerning those who know not God, and who do not believe in the Gospel, that “they shall suffer punishment, even eternal destruction.” How then is that temporary which is everlasting?

This homily from an esteemed exegete of scripture makes the eternality of hell clear in no uncertain terms, and on a scriptural basis. Who are we to believe, Hart or Saint John Chrysostom?

Fr. John Whiteford in his article, referenced previously, also mentions that he has asked Hart for passages which look to passages such as these with the alternative, i.e. Hart’s view, and he has failed to provide even one. Fr. John makes a further point that Hart’s resistance to provide such a commentary, beyond the lack of evidence for his view is also further evidence that such a commentary does not exist, as otherwise “universalists like DBH would quite it with regularity.”

This approach to scripture shares much with Hart’s approach to the Oecumenical councils, which we saw in his quote above. Namely, he will interpret scripture and the councils and the fathers in accord with his secular, rationalistic presuppositions, despite the evidence against his views. This is not to say that Hart is necessarily being disingenuous or not academically honest, but rather that at the very least he is very confused in his reasoning and is unaware of the influence his, potentially, unacknowledged presuppositions play in his so-called neutral logic and reasoning.

Commentary of the Holy Fathers on Hart’s Scripture Passages

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The Errors in Hart’s Usage of Scripture

In his second meditation, Hart gives a long list of scripture passages which he proposes support his universalist view. While it is certainly commendable to ground one’s view in scripture, Hart’s usage of scripture here, in accord with his erroneous presuppositions outlined previously, is not helpful for true understanding. How is this so?

Hart leaves us with a long list of scripture passages both in Greek and his own English translation, interspersed with his comments on how a passage surely or perhaps supports his position. At face value, what is wrong here? The error lies in how the reader is invited to approach the passages at hand. The reader is intended to read through the passages, having been primed to read them through Hart’s presuppositional lens, likely skipping over the Greek, but impressed by it’s inclusion, thinking Hart is taking a neutral position and merely laying out verses with his translation for convenience. However, from the outset this approach to scripture is wrong. This approach to scripture is assumed to be neutral, but it is not. Nor should a neutral approach be taken toward scripture, nor is such an approach even possible.

Hart is laying out scripture quotes here for the reader to approach in a pseudo-protestant, secular, rationalistic manner. This approach assumes that if the text is approached in a “neutral” manner, without those nasty presuppositions and baggage, the true meaning of the text can be uncovered, especially through a secular study of the original languages. This approach could not be more misguided.

Such a neutrality is not possible. When approaching scripture, or any text, we are viewing it through our presuppositions, whether acknowledged or not. Here, Hart is viewing these texts through his secular, rationalistic, and universalist presuppositions, even while he claims neutrality. Likewise, Hart is inviting the reader to approach the texts in this “neutral” manner, having been primed by his previous discussion to view them under his lens. I do not however believe Hart is being intentionally dishonest here. Rather, Hart is so stuck in his rationalistic presuppositions that he cannot acknowledge that they are there. He truly believes that his approach is neutral and that if his opponents would only look at the issue with honesty and without their “baggage,” they would come to his viewpoint. Because of this, there is perhaps more of an excuse for the inflammatory remarks toward and characterisations of his opponents throughout the work.

How then should we approach the scriptures then? If we aren’t to approach them as an atomistic, rationalistic individual, we must approach them through the Holy Fathers. This is not to say that everything any one of the fathers has to say is necessarily correct, but through a careful study one can come to see the so called consensus patrum, or the consensus of the fathers. Through this study one can come to see the one faith shared by the fathers and come to see scripture not through our own personal presuppositions and desires but through the mind of the fathers, the mind of the Church.

Thus, in order to facilitate such an endeavour, which is by no means easy or fast, I will provide a few relevant passages from the fathers relating to Hart’s verses. Due to the quantity of passages and the work required to find relevant quotes amongst all the fathers, not all verses will be treated, but enough will be provided to act as a starting point for further growth in understanding of the scriptures.

The Scripture Passages

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The following scripture passages will be given in the King James version, due to copyright.

The passage John 12:47 quoted by Hart should certainly be expanded by one verse to encompass John 12:47-48, lest the sense of it be twisted.

Let us examine also a few passages which give the opposite position, which Hart would explain away by the ambiguity of the Greek and paucity of our translations. For instance he mentions Matthew 25:46.

Or perhaps also the passage from Mark quoted in the previous section.

I think these passages should suffice to give a starting point for developing a proper understanding of the scriptures. As for Hart, he would likely discount these fathers as being merely more members of the confused “infernalist” camp as he so calls it. He would discount them based on his presuppositions, claiming for himself “neutrality.” It is these presuppositions that draw him not to see what the consensus patrum might be, but rather to declare “nor do I doubt which theologians are the best guides to scripture as a whole: Gregory, Origen, Evagrius, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Diodore of Tarsus, Isaac of Nineveh” (p. 76). Hart declares them to be the best guides to scripture insofar as they are in accord, or seem to be in accord, with Hart’s opinions, based in his “neutrality.” Thus because Hart is “neutral” they must be the best guides to scripture as they also come to the conclusions one would on a neutral basis, rather than those held down by “infernalist” baggage. It is quite an interesting position to claim the previous list to be better interpreters of scripture than St. John Chrysostom, the foremost among commentators of scripture, except perhaps due to his unfortunate tendency to explicitly speak against Hart’s universalist position. Yet, more than this, it should give anyone pause when a list of the best guides to scripture include more condemned heretics than saints of the Church. To be fair, above I have included passages from Tertulian of Carthage and Severian of Gabala, one condemned and one not a saint of the Church. I have not included them out of any elevation of their status as interpreters of scripture, but insofar as they accord with the other fathers and saints of the Church and serve to give an indication of the consensus patrum. Ignore them if you will, the one faith of the fathers still stands.

Hart’s Notion of Free Will and Choice

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Hart has a mistaken notion of free will and choice that he expresses in his rebuttal of those who critique universalism on the basis that it entails a denial of free will. I will not go into detail on Hart’s argument here, but will rather point to how his notion of will is mistaken. This, if fleshed out, serves also to show how Hart’s rebuttal is inadequate, but the details will be left to the reader (at this point the more fundamental critique’s of Hart’s position outlined previously are of greater importance).

How does Hart err in his presentation of the will? Once again it is due to his presuppositions. Hart is fully wedded to the presentation of the God of classical theism, rather than the God of revelation. Due to this, Hart rejects the essence-energies distinction, as mentioned previously, and sees God’s essence as His existence, which is also convertible with Goodness. Thus Hart argues that the human natural will is necessarily drawn to God and it is precisely this that ensures freedom, rather than destroying it. Hart even mentions the conception of the gnomic will in St. Maximus the Confessor, and how this accounts for our experience of our fallible choices prior to our ultimately being drawn to God in eternity. Yet, he fundamentally misunderstands St. Maximus, who in fact refutes him. It is to St. Maximus the Confessor’s theology that we will now turn.

It is difficult to summarize the theology of St. Maximus, but perhaps I will instead offer a reading suggestion for a more thorough treatment. The book Free Choice in Saint Maximus the Confessor by Dr. Joseph Farrell gives a wonderful treatment of this aspect of his theology. Another helpful book which touches upon the issue is the Disputations with Pyrrhus by St. Maximus the Confessor himself, translated by the same Dr. Ferrell.

I will not, however, leave this merely with the recommendation of two books, although not too lengthy. Another source which offers a nice summary of St. Maximus’s theology, in the same vein as Dr. Farrell’s work, can be found in a blog post here. While one may object to such a format, the information is quite a faithful presentation and it is much shorter and easier to access.

Hart’s major error, in line with Origen, is his confusion of the natural faculty of will, the object of will, and the mode of willing. Hart, like Origen, conflates these three aspects, although in a similar, but not identical manner. In brief, we can see the ramifications of Origen’s conflation of faculty of will and object of willing in his necessity of creation, and further, we can see the mode of willing conflated as well in his doctrine of apokatastasis, where the restoration of nature necessitates the restoration of person as well. For Origen, holding to neoplatonic simplicity, free will is between objects in dialectic tension. Free choice then is rather freedom from choice, choosing only the One. For God to have choice in creation would be to introduce multiplicity in Him and thus imperfection. For Origen, created beings, being multiple and not One, they are always in motion, yet with God being an absolutely simple essence, there is only one object of choice. Thus Origen, to maintain the person rather than absorption of all into the One, must allow for a continuous cycle of falls. Hart on the other hand, defines personhood not in this motion per se, but in relationality. Thus Hart is comfortable with the Origenistic conflation, whilst both denying continuous falls and affirming the necessary drawing of all to God, through the faculty-object-mode hybrid of willing.

There are several problems with this account, however, and it is not at all in accord with the theology of St. Maximus. First, St. Maximus makes clear distinctions between the faculty, object, and mode of willing. It is true that ultimately God is the object of the faculty of will, but this does not necessitate the result that Hart claims it does. This is because the will is always exercised in a hypostatic mode. Arguing against the monothelites, St. Maximus argues that the will is a faculty of nature and not of hypostasis, but it is not just of nature, as the faculty is distinguished from the mode, or tropos of willing, which is the hypostatic use.

When Hart argues that the ability to sin must not be part of human nature, as Christ was unable to sin, yet fully human, he is correct. In this reasoning, if the ability to sin were a necessary part of human nature, either Christ must have had the capacity to sin or He was not fully human. Yet, the error here is that our ability to sin lies not in our nature per se. Maximus makes this clear in his discussion of the virtues.

Pyrrhus: Virtues, then, are natural things?

Maximus: Yes, natural things.

Pyrrhus: If they be natural things, why do they not exist in all men equally, since all men have an identical nature?

Maximus: But they do exist equally in all men because of the identical nature!

Pyrrhus: Then why is there such a great disparity [of virtues] in us?

Maximus: Because we do not all practice what is natural to us to an equal degree; indeed, if we [all] practiced equally [those virtues] natural to us as we were created to do, then one would be able to perceive one virtue in us all, just as there is one nature [in us all], and “one virtue” would not admit of a “more” or “less.”

Pyrrhus: If virtue be something natural [to us], and if what is natural to us existeth not through asceticism but by reason of our creation, then why is it that we acquire the virtues, which are natural, with asceticism and labours?

Maximus: Asceticism, and the toils that go with it, was devised simply in order to ward off deception, which established itself through sensory perception. It is not [as if] the virtues have been newly introduced from outside, for they inhere in us from creation, as hath already been said. Therefore, when deception is completely expelled, the soul immediately exhibits the splendor of its natural virtue.

(Disputations with Pyrrhus 88-95, pp. 84-5)

Thus, our ability to sin is not due to our nature, in which the virtues exist in all equally, but rather in our hypostatic employment of our natural faculties of energy and will. It is not even the case that gnomie is part of created hypostases but not uncreated, as for the blessed in heaven, they too are unable to sin, yet remain created hypostases. It comes rather from our lack of habitually exercising the virtue in our nature, healed by Christ. Our hypostatic employment of our natural faculty of will, which has as its end God, must be integrated in virtue.

We can see how this distinction is important by examining Adam’s fall in the garden. Under Hart’s view, not distinguishing the faculty from hypostatic mode of use, how was Adam able to sin at all? If Christ was unable to sin, on account of human nature not necessitating this ability to sin, rather than due to His hypostatic use, then Adam, in the beginning not yet having a damaged human nature, would also be unable to sin, willing God as the object of his natural faculty of will. If all must of necessity come to will God hypostatically due to the natural faculty of will having God as its object, there is no reason that a fall should have been possible in the first place.

Looking at Adam through the lens of St. Maximus, however, a clearer picture emerges, both of man’s condition in the garden and in the eschaton. Adam was created good, in the image and likeness of God, yet, he was not yet exercised in the habit of virtue in the hypostatic employment of his will. Thus, despite the goodness of his nature he was able to sin. He was born with the capacity for divinization, but without yet fully integrating it with virtue hypostatically, as is the case for the blessed in heaven, who are unable to sin, yet remain fully free. Thus, the gnomie, which is our condition of willing, not yet having integrated our hypostatic employment of our natural faculties, is accidental to human nature. Christ, of course, was not able to sin, not because this ability is not essential to human nature, but being the uncreated hypostasis of the eternal Word, His hypostatic employment of his natural human faculty of will was always integrated with virtue. Thus did St. Maximus say:

These natural things of the will are present in Him, but not exactly in the same manner as they are in us. He verily did hunger and thirst, not in a mode similar to ours, but in a mode which surpasseth us, in other words, voluntarily. Thus, He was truly afraid [in Gethsemane], not as we are, but in a mode surpassing us. To put it concisely: all things that are natural in Christ have both the rational principle proper to human nature, but a super-natural mode of existence, in order that both the [human] nature, by means of its rational principle, and the Economy, by means of its super-natural mode of existence, might be believed.

(Disputations with Pyrrhus 35, pp. 69-70)

This too has a radical implication for St. Maximus’s doctrine of apokatastasis, in contrast to Origen and Hart’s. In St. Maximus’s apokatastasis, all things are recapitulated in Christ, just as with Origen’s, yet due to the distinction between natural faculty and hypostatic mode of employment, the end result is different. Christ’s redemptive work draws all things to ever-being, healing what was damaged in the fall, yet it is the hypostatic employment of these natural faculties which determines whether this is ever-ill-being or ever-well-being. Thus, as formulated by many of the Holy Fathers, hell is the hypostatic state in ever-being with God, where one remains in rebellion. We are all in rebellion and sin, yet the blessed in heaven, overcoming the gnomie and integrating their hypostatic employment with virtue, through repentance and God’s grace, are in ever-well-being.

A further problem with Hart’s picture is the free will of the blessed in heaven. For Hart, holding to the plotinian notion of absolute simplicity of the One, there is only one possible object of the will in heaven. Yet, for St. Maximus, even accounting for the hypostatic employment, this is not enough to ensure free will. For St. Maximus, the objects of the will are the many logoi, God’s uncreated energies. God’s uncreated energies are the objects of willing for the blessed, which offer a genuine choice between goods, both distinct yet not separate, without the possibility of sinning. Hart, in his denial of the essence-energies distinction as well as in his confusion of faculty and mode of willing, has an impoverished account of free will on two accounts.

There is a further troublesome implication of Hart’s confusion of faculty and mode of willing. In looking at Christ’s employment of his human faculty of will and inability to sin, one is faced with a difficult dilemma. Given how the natural faculty of will is tied to its hypostatic employment, in order to maintain that Christ has two natures, one would have to also posit two hypostases to undergird these natural faculties. Thus there is a pseudo-nestorianism underlying this confusion of faculty and mode of willing. This confusion itself is yet another example of the mixing up of nature and person, often said to be the root of all heresy.

This pseudo-nestorianism, though subtle, can be seen in Hart’s argument against those who he says may argue “that the sinlessness of Jesus of Nazareth was no more than a special accident of the specific person he was, and that in every other sense his humanity would have been capable of sin had it been instantiated in some other person.” (p. 160, emphasis added). In some sense, he is correct, the capacity is not in human nature per se, yet, the statement is also correct, that human nature instantiated in “some other person,” i.e. a created hypostasis would be able to sin. Hart’s conception of how Christ heals the human natural faculty of will, through his adoption of human nature, due to how closely he has tied the natural faculty and hypostatic employment, almost necessitates that Christ has either adopted also a human hypostasis, as in this scheme our mode of employment of will flows necessarily from the nature, or Christ has annihilated the distinction between created and uncreated hypostasis, leading to a form of pantheism.

Hart’s overall work flirts with a form of pseudo-nestorianism in many places. His statements in this discussion and shortly after, while they could perhaps be given an orthodox reading, seen in the light of the implications of his argument, seem as though they have a pseudo-nestorian sense, on the face. Statements such as “even if this capacity was wanting in just the single person that Jesus happened to be, while yet that single person possessed a full and undiminished human will and human mind …” (p. 160). The problem here is that Jesus didn’t just happen to be a single person, as though he were perhaps just some man, joined to the eternal Word, but Jesus IS the person of the eternal word. Perhaps this is just a case of sloppy wording, but it is nonetheless worth mentioning. Furthermore, he states “He had a perfect knowledge of the Good and was perfectly rational; hence, as a man, he could not sin; hence, he alone among men was fully free” (p. 161). Again, this statement could be unproblematic in itself, if it means, as I hope it was intended to mean in respect to Christ’s human nature He could not sin. Yet, mentioning Christ as “a man,” in such a context could be dangerously interpreted as pseudo-nestorianism. St. Cyril of Alexandria was hesitant to accept calling Christ “a man” as this could lead to Him being thought of as a human person, of which He is not. Surely, Christ is fully human, but he is not a human person. Given that sinning is the act of a subject, attributing this inability to Christ “as a man,” referring to His human nature, is dangerous. Christ’s inability to sin is foremost in His uncreated hypostatic mode of exercise, as a subject of action. Although it is not incorrect per se to attribute this inability to Christ “as a man,” given the context this is questionable. Furthermore, Hart’s approach to scripture, in his extensive use of higher criticism, also reeks of Nestorianism.

Of course, I am not claiming Hart in any way intends to say that Christ was a human person, or to espouse any form of Nestorianism; yet in the implications of his theology, he certainly comes dangerously close, if he doesn’t fully arrive there.

Conclusion

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Overall, the errors in David Bentley Hart’s argumentation, or lack thereof largely, can be boiled down to his presuppositions. He has presupposed certain things which, taken together with the views he is attempting to critique, are incoherent. Thus Hart tries to assert that those positions he is attempting to critique are incoherent, based on a further assumption that his presuppositions are necessarily true, or are in some sense neutral. That is not to say that his presuppositions are necessarily false (although they are, as can be seen from their incoherence and discord with the faith of the Holy Fathers), but he certainly has not given epistemological justification to them for the sake of his argument, and furthermore I would argue that they are, largely, not the presuppositions held in a traditional Christian system, but those of enlightenment rationalism. That they are not the presuppositions of a traditional Christian system is ironically evidenced by Hart’s argumentation. That the systems Hart is arguing against are seen to be incoherent on Hart’s assumptions shows that they are operating on a different set of presuppositions, on the assumption that those that held the views were not in outright contradiction (a modest position to take, being that some of the views, i.e. the Thomist would be argued to ultimately be contradictory, while in a subtler way than Hart argues, i.e. the Thomist is rationally capable enough to not fall prey to the supposed obvious contradictions Hart attempts to construct).

Hart’s disposition and approach could not be better summarized than in his closing remarks, where he confesses that if his universalist position were not to be found in accord with the Christian faith, he would rather give up the Christian faith than his universalism. This is decidedly not the correct approach to the Christian faith. Hart definitively stakes his claim on his rationalistic presuppositions as ultimate, rather than faith in the One True God. The proper approach to faith and salvation is one of repentance, of metanoia. We are all in rebellion against God, and our employment of our natural faculties, including our reason, is distorted without the healing grace that comes through asceticism and living life in the faith through our experience of the Church and her healing Mysteries. Thus, ultimately, our theology must at heart be therapeutic and experiential. We must come to it through the experience of the Church and growth in the faith and God’s grace, which through our continual repentance allows us to see more clearly its truths. Hart, rather, has decided to trust more surely in his fallen reason, than in the Christian faith.

This is a trap all to easy for any of us to all in to. I pray that the words in this short essay are a truthful testament to the authentic faith, but if they are to be found lacking or contrary to it, I will surely cast them all aside. It is through repentance that we are able to grow in God’s grace and cast aside our worldly logic and presuppositions, seeing the true logic though the eyes of faith. I pray that we all, Hart included, can come to a further repentance and deeper relationship with and understanding of God, through his grace. Amen.