Presuppositional Divide: When Worldviews Collide
May 16, 7529 O.SN.S.
Orthodoxy Philosophy Politics Theology
Statement of the Problem, or, “What in the world is happening?”
There is a strange (at some level) phenomenon that seems to be happening more and more in American (political) discourse and across the world more broadly. Increasingly, we see various news outlets purportedly reporting on the same set of facts, but the story we hear is entirely different, as though they were coming from two parallel worlds. Many, both from the left and the right, are quick to claim that this is merely an instance of the other side lying or spreading “fake-news.” While it is undoubtedly true that the media does lie, and manipulate, and tell half-truths, that is not the whole story here. It’s not just the media either. Many everyday people on both sides sincerely believe that their side is correct and that the other side is not only wrong but also dishonest. If they are looking at the same facts honestly, how could they come to such wildly different interpretations unless through purposeful dishonesty?
The Great Enlightenment Lie
Conservative political commentator Ben Shapiro is well known for saying what has become a catchphrase of sorts:
facts don’t care about your feelings
even having two books, Facts Don’t Care about Your Feelings and Facts (Still) Don’t Care About Your Feelings, published referencing the phrase. However you may feel about the political views of Mr. Shapiro or his opponents, this phrase seems to capture a misunderstanding that is undergirding this breakdown of discussion today. The slogan relies on a critical presupposition that there is such a thing as a “bare fact.” This is the great Enlightenment lie, the notion that there are “bare facts” out there that we can look at in a detached and purely objective manner. We are thus able to approach the truth through a thorough examination of such “facts.” When a disagreement arises, it can be resolved by presenting the relevant “facts,” which, if honest, the other side will recognize and use to reconsider their position.
Yet, not only is this conception of “fact” misguided, it was unknown prior to the “Enlightenment” era. “Facts” don’t exist in a bare state without interpretation. What we see as “facts” are really a composite of fact plus our interpretation through our presuppositional lens. Even if unacknowledged (and by extension unexamined), we all have certain presuppositions about metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics (and perhaps æsthetics if not considered under another category) which influence how we analyze and interpret events into “facts.” This is true for even the most basic of affairs. For example, say I see a dog outside and report, “there is a dog outside.” This presupposes a particular view about what a dog is. Is it merely a name, or does the dog have a certain dog-nature? Is the dog purely material or a hylemorphic form-matter composite? Can I trust my sense of sight? Do I have knowledge about the dog? Should I honestly report what I have seen? These questions just begin to scratch the surface of how our presuppositions about metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, or our “worldview,” influence our interpretation of facts.
What we see happening more and more today is not merely a disagreement about “the facts,” but is instead a (mostly unacknowledged) clash of worldviews looking at the same “facts.” So in a certain sense, Mr. Shapiro is correct, facts really don’t care about your feelings, but this isn’t about the “facts,” so to speak. We have two sides looking at the same events through two increasingly different worldviews, thus coming to radically different interpretations. Both sides can’t help but think that the other is being dishonest because they don’t acknowledge their worldview’s role in their interpretation of the “facts.” Both sides have bought into the Enlightenment lie about the existence of such “bare facts.”
But what went wrong? Why is everything breaking down now, whereas before, while there may have been disagreements, dialogue and discussion were still possible? The United States was founded upon secular Enlightenment principles. Despite having a pseudo-religious veneer, the foundational presuppositions were thoroughly secular (in the a-religious rather than anti-religious sense). It was primarily due to the myth of the “bare fact” that such an experiment as the American experiment was possible. How can such disparate groups operate as a cohesive whole when their beliefs differ significantly? The American mind was split between the civil, secular realm of “bare facts” and the realm of personal belief. And despite their differences, the worldview of most of the citizens was not all that different. The people mostly shared a worldview of this secular, Enlightenment liberalism, perhaps “classical liberalism,” mixed with a heritage of what has sometimes been called “Judeo-(Western)Christian values” (I personally dislike using such a term; it often implies quite an œcumenistic or perennial view. Additionally, as the Church is the true Israel, the true “Judeo-Christian values” are simply the values of the Church, not a watered-down “core” of “shared values”). The similarities in worldview allowed discourse to happen. Yet, the worldview was somewhat unstable, being a combination of secular and religious presuppositions, which were not necessarily compatible on the whole.
Classical Foundationalism vs. Coherentism
How could such ideas reside side-by-side? Counter to the classical foundationalist view of justification, which holds that we have a particular set of properly basic (or foundational) beliefs upon which we deductively reason to our other beliefs, people don’t hold their beliefs in such a simple manner. Having such contradictory presuppositions in our belief system on such a view would cause a total collapse. Yet, this is not the only possible view of justification. Another view, commonly termed the coherence view of justification (related to but distinct from the coherence theory of truth), rose to prominence much due to the work of philosopher Willard Van Orman Quine. However, the view had been present in some form for many years prior (see the paper “An Orthodox Theory of Knowledge: Epistemological and Apologetic Methods of the Church Fathers” by Fr. Dcn. Dr. Ananias (Erik) Sorem or the book “Irenaeus and Orthodox Apologetic Methodology: A Neopatristic Presuppositionalism” by Fr. Joshua Schooping). This view states that instead of properly basic foundational beliefs, our beliefs are instead like a web, with certain beliefs holding more importance or more robust and numerous connections, and with other beliefs being more on the periphery. In the classical foundationalist view, when faced with contradictory information, one must give up a particular presupposition from which the contradictory proposition is derived (along with those other propositions derived from the erroneous presupposition). Yet, in the coherentist view, the ways our web of beliefs shift to accommodate new information are not so simple. New information that (seemingly) threatens core beliefs often causes shifts in other auxiliary beliefs, which serve to protect the core beliefs and the coherence of the web as a whole.
For example, perhaps I hold a belief that dogs can fly, and it is relatively central to my web of belief. Perhaps, I believe that dogs can exercise this ability whenever they please as well, although this belief is less central. Say you present me with new information, various stories of dogs falling from high places and hurting themselves. Indeed, this is somewhat in conflict with my view that dogs can fly. If they can fly, why wouldn’t they do so to avoid injury in these circumstances? Rather than give up my belief that dogs can fly, instead, I may give up the belief that they can exercise this ability whenever they please, perhaps there was some extraneous factor, such as fatigue, which prevented the dogs from flying in these circumstances, or maybe I keep this belief as well, preferring to think that the dogs must have had some other (unknown to us) reason for not wanting to fly.
This example is quite silly and basic but illustrates an important point about how our belief systems work: when presented with new or contradictory information or propositions, our beliefs don’t always shift straightforwardly, nor do they always shift right away. It is essential to see that in this view, we cannot talk about justified belief, or knowledge perhaps, concerning a single proposition, but instead regarding the coherence of the entire web of belief. Simply put, a proposition is justified insofar as it coheres with the rest of the web of belief. This parallels quite nicely the concepts expressed earlier concerning the myth of “bare facts” and the need to take into account the presuppositions of one’s worldview when looking at the interpretation of events. In fact, it is somewhat likely that the adoption of the “classical foundationalist” view of justification in the post-schism West led to the development of this Enlightenment view of “bare facts,” whereas it was unknown in the East where the coherentist view predominated.
Worldviews Move toward Consistency
When one holds an inconsistent or incoherent worldview, as mentioned above, this doesn’t always resolve itself in straightforward ways, and it doesn’t always do so right away. I can take time for these inconsistencies to come to the fore or work themselves out. Yet, over time, worldviews tend to move toward becoming more consistent. In the United States, where the cohesion of society was held together by such an unstable worldview, it is not surprising that this worldview would change over time. Not only change, but it would change in different directions for different people. This is what we are seeing today; a fracturing of the American worldview, which was never entirely stable to begin with. Some work out their inconsistency by adopting wholesale a secular “classical liberal” worldview (much of the center, center-left, and center-right, broadly speaking). Some adopt the “Western Christian” or “Judeo-Christian” worldview instead and leave behind certain principles of the secular worldview (much of the right, broadly speaking). Some do so by throwing out the old almost entirely and adopting a different worldview instead, such as Marxism and its derivatives (much of the modern left, broadly speaking). This fracturing is also occurring across denominational lines. One can find a nominal “Christian” who may fall in any of the above three camps. This brings up an important point; despite the veneer that cloaks one’s language, one’s worldview may be entirely different. It often takes a bit of work to precisely analyze what constitutes the core beliefs in the web of one’s worldview. The three camps listed above are not meant to be exhaustive but rather to illustrate some of today’s potential views.
Presuppositional Critique
Where do we go from here? For we know:
if a kingdom be divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand (Mark 3:24 KJV).
It should be clear now how such a fracturing can lead to a breakdown in political discourse and discussion such as we are seeing today. But what can we do about it? There isn’t much we can do at a basic level to initiate discussion, at least on the level of “facts” with such disparate worldviews. We cannot exist as a single cohesive society when we have such stark differences in fundamental beliefs. This doesn’t mean we can do nothing, however. Rather than engaging at the level of “facts,” we must instead engage at the level of “worldviews.” In discussions, we shouldn’t argue over the facts, but instead, we should go to a meta-level critique and comparison of worldviews. We won’t change someone’s mind by arguing over the facts alone when they don’t share a worldview with a certain similarity to our own. In this case, we must convince them of the errors of their worldview and the coherence brought by our own. Only when they change their worldview will they be open to changing their view of the facts. In fact, once their worldview is changed, changing their view of the facts becomes almost automatic. Don’t take me wrong, though; changing another’s worldview is a long, arduous process with a high failure rate. But, in such circumstances, it’s the only thing we can try to do to bring discussion back to the table.
Christ is the Truth
Finally, it is essential to clarify that the coherentist view of justification does not imply that truth is relative/there is no objective truth, or that all that matters is the coherence of sets of beliefs rather than their content. It is easy to reconcile the belief in objective truth and the coherentist view. Ultimately, we will say that out of all of the potential worldviews to hold, only one is genuinely coherent (one may also consider not individual worldviews, but classes of worldviews sharing common features). This one coherent view is the Truth, who is Jesus Christ. Ultimately, the Truth is found in a person. It is the worldview of the Church. This worldview is the worldview that we strive to adopt, the phronema, or Orthodox mind of the Apostles and Church Fathers. Yet, in contrast to Western views, this does not consist (solely) in a list of propositions to be held or consented to. This lack of such a systematic list is often a source of frustration for the West looking east. Yet, instead, it is a change of heart, a metanoia, repentance, bringing about an entirely new worldview. This worldview, of course, has implications for belief, and the lack of such a systematic list of propositions for belief does not imply that one can merely believe anything. In fact, it is much stronger. One does not only have to slot a certain list of beliefs into whatever compatible worldview one can find but must adopt the Church’s phronema. This is a much more pervasive form of belief. Yet, it is not belief alone. This phronema is not attained through rational discourse or thought alone, but by living out the life of the Church, through orthopraxis, living out the Faith through the ascetic tradition, the Divine Liturgy and other Divine Services, the Holy Mysteries, as well as through the studies of the Holy Scriptures and the Church Fathers. It is a worldview that must be lived, not merely adhered to.
Ultimately, until the United States is converted, we will not see a ceasing of such political strife. Ultimately, until we ourselves are converted, we will not cease sowing such strife. Ultimately, we must focus on our own repentance and conversion until one day, God willing, we will attain, by God’s grace, the full phronema, the Orthodox Heart, in the Kingdom, where there is “righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost” (Romans 14:17b KJV).